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Fixed Platform Performance During Recent Hurricanes: Comparison to Design Standards

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Abstract

Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita passed through over 3,000 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico during 2004 and 2005. While most structures performed adequately, 123 were destroyed and over 183 had major above and or below water damage. There was no life loss and no significant pollution, which is a tribute to the Minerals Management Service (MMS) oversight and American Petroleum Institute (API) design codes, specifically API RP2A (RP2A) for the structural design of fixed offshore platforms. RP2A has evolved considerably over the past 38 years since its first edition in October 1969. Some of this is attributable to changes in engineering practice and the results of experimental studies. Some is attributable to the experiences and lessons learned in large storms and hurricanes.

These three recent hurricanes resulted in the largest number of destroyed and damaged platforms in the history of Gulf of Mexico operations. There are several industry, API and MMS studies underway to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to update industry guidelines and practices accordingly. This paper presents the initial results of a study performed for the MMS on the performance of fixed platforms in these hurricanes. The paper also ties-in findings of the work and its correlation to RP2A design practices.

Background

While hurricanes are not a welcome sight in the Gulf of Mexico, they do provide opportunity to observe how platforms perform in the storms and if required, an opportunity to update design codes accordingly. In fact, development of RP2A was in part driven by several hurricanes in the late to mid 1960's including Carla (1961), Hilda (1964), Betsy (1965) and in particular hurricane Camille (1969), which was one of the largest hurricanes to impact platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. All of these hurricanes damaged or destroyed platforms and the industry responded with the development of RP2A. In the 1970's, RP2A further evolved and the platforms were tested by hurricanes Carmen (1974) and Frederic (1979). The 9th edition of RP2A was issued in November 1977 and contained the first industry accepted wave load "recipe" including the use of 100 year return period conditions and consistent hydrodynamic drag and inertia coefficients. The 9th edition represents a substantial improvement in platform design, and is in fact demonstrated by the better performance of 9th edition and later RP2A designs in these hurricanes, as describe later.

In 1985 hurricane Juan spawned in the Gulf of Mexico as a "Sudden Hurricane" and the industry was not able to evacuate all of the platforms. Several manned platforms were severely damaged, including several that toppled during the storm. Fortunately, there was no direct life loss associated with the fixed platform failures. Later investigation determined that the platforms were older vintage and in need of repair prior to Juan. It was clear that specific guidelines were required for assessment of existing offshore platforms for fitness of purpose. The industry, including significant support from the MMS, began a series of joint industry and special projects, as well as API initiatives to develop an assessment standard for existing platforms. The result was RP2A Section 17, developed in the early 1990's and originally published in 1996 as a supplement to the 20th edition. Interestingly, in 1992 during the development of Section 17, hurricane Andrew damaged or destroyed dozens of older Gulf of Mexico platforms. A hurricane the size of Andrew had not occurred since Camille and provided an opportunity to both test and then calibrate Section 17 during its development. In 2002 hurricane Lili damaged and destroyed several older platforms, something that had not been seen since Andrew. At the time, it was thought that Lili was a moderate to large storm, and that the industry had fared well with only a few older platforms destroyed. This all changed in 2004 with hurricane Ivan, and even further in 2005 with hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Ivan, Katrina and Rita

Figure 1 shows the paths of Ivan, Katrina and Rita as they moved through the over 3,000 Gulf of Mexico platforms, indicated by the small dots. Also shown in Figure 1 are the newly proposed metocean regions for the Gulf of Mexico, defined as East, Central, West Central and West [1]. The Central region has significantly higher metocean conditions than the other three regions. The figure gives an indication of the number of platforms contained within each region, with the West Central containing the largest number, followed by the Central and West regions. Ivan and Katrina were located in the most severe metocean region, the Central region. Rita, which was a lesser hurricane in comparison, primarily impacted platforms in the West Central region.

Following Katrina and Rita, the MMS issued several Notices to Lessees (NTLs) that required platform owners to perform above and below water inspections of the 3,000+ platforms east of the NTL line shown in Figure 1 [2]. Owners then submitted the information to the MMS on a regular basis, indicating if the platform escaped the hurricanes with no damage, if the platform incurred minor or major damaged or if the platform was destroyed. There were a total of 123 destroyed as a result of the three hurricanes.

Platforms Destroyed by Vintage

Figure 2 shows the number of destroyed platforms by vintage according to decade. The 1st edition of RP2A released in 1969, the 9th edition in 1977 and the current 21st edition in 2000 are also shown. It is clear that over time the platform structural designs have been improved. There is a dramatic reduction in destroyed platforms from the 1960's to the 1970's as platforms began to follow RP2A. There is another significant reduction in destroyed platforms between the 1970's and 1980's as the 9th edition was introduced – including its improved wave load recipe. A total of 35 platforms that were installed since 1980 were destroyed; however, about 30% were A-3 and another 10% were L-3, both being minimal low consequence facilities. These platforms generally contain a single well or a few wells that are often designed to reduced criteria. Twice as many platforms were destroyed that were installed in the 30 year period from 1950 to 1980 compared to the 25 year period from 1980 to 2005. The single largest failure group is the 1960 vintage platforms, which account for almost one half of the total destroyed.

Platforms Destroyed by API Category

Section 17 categorizes platforms according to consequence of failure, designated as A-1 for high consequence, A-2 for medium consequence and A-3 as low consequence. The formal definitions are contained in RP2A. Over the past few years, the MMS requested platform owners to classify their platforms according to these categories and submit the resulting designation. Figure 2 also shows the number of destroyed platforms by API category. The category data was not available for some of the platforms, in which case the platform category was designated as unknown. Review of the categorized destroyed platforms indicates that a majority were A-2, predominately of 1960s vintage.

There were only seven A-1 platforms destroyed. This is in part due to the higher Section 17 strength and deck elevation requirements for a platform to be designated as A-1. Figure 3 shows the cellar deck elevations of the destroyed platforms compared to the RP2A minimum deck elevation requirements. The deck elevation was available on most but not all of the destroyed platforms so not all of the destroyed platforms are shown. As shown by the figure, a majority of the destroyed platforms had deck elevations less than the A-1 requirement. A wave crest hitting a platform deck creates a very large load that will likely result in significant platform damage and in many cases collapse. Hence a key ingredient in surviving hurricanes is to have a deck elevation above the largest hurricane waves. API is currently investigating minimum deck elevation requirements and an update to RP2A is possible. A more detailed comparison of deck elevations to RP2A criteria for these hurricanes is contained in OMAE 2007 [3].

From 2000 onward, the platforms are classified per RP2A Section 2 categories of L-1 high, L-2 medium or L-3 low consequence. Technically, platforms designed to RPA 21st edition, issued in 2000, are not available for Section 17 Assessment and hence the Section 2 classification is used. A key observation is that there were no RP2A 20th edition L-1 platforms destroyed in the hurricanes. The 20th edition was issued in 1993 and included a major change to the RP2A wave load recipe, resulting in a significant increase in the design metocean loading for L-1 conditions. Other lower consequence platforms could be designated as L-2 and L-3 allowing the use of reduced criteria. The industry began to implement this approach on new L-1 platforms in mid to late 1990's with most L-1 platforms designed to the 20th edition by about 2000. The fact that none of these L-1 platforms were destroyed in the hurricanes is an indicator of the improved performance of these latest generation RP2A L-1 platforms. However, several L-2 and L-3 platforms installed in the last five years, that used the lower criteria, were destroyed.

Platform Damage

Figure 4 shows the number of platforms with major damage as function of decade installed. The figure also shows the number of platforms according to API consequence category. Major damage was defined as significant damage either below or above water or both. Damage below water included separated or torn members, cracked members, members with numerous holes, dents or a combination of these, cracked welds, missing members or buckled members. Damage above water includes broken and separated deck members, damage to deck girders from wave crest loading and other types of damage to primary deck structure. As seen in Figure 4, there is a reduction in the number of damaged platforms from 1970 onward, but the reduction is not as dramatic as for destroyed platforms. One explanation is that the older platforms have less damage tolerance, and hence are more likely to be destroyed, while the newer platforms have higher damage tolerance, and are more prone to damage than destruction. Similar to the destroyed platforms, the A-2 platforms have the most damage, followed by A-3 and then A-1. An important point is that there were no L-1 platforms damaged, indicating again the exceptional performance of the L-1 platform designs.

Table 1 shows the number of platforms exposed to hurricane conditions, damaged and destroyed in each of the proposed metocean regions, namely the West Central and Central, as function of API category. The dataset is based upon the set of platforms requiring post hurricane inspections per the MMS NTL. Hence, not all of the platforms located in West Central Zone are included in the dataset since the MMS NTL line bisects some of this region (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, the West Central region has the largest number of platforms exposed to the hurricanes, primarily Rita. The West Central also has the largest number of destroyed and damaged platform, even though Rita was a smaller storm than Ivan and Katrina. This is partly explained by the larger number of platforms exposed in the West Central region, but also since this region had not experienced a significant hurricane in decades. In comparison, Andrew (1992) damaged and destroyed many platforms at the Central / West Central boundary [4]. Had Andrew not already passed through this region, the Ivan and Katrina damage and destruction would have been larger.

Pancake Leg Damage

Studies of post storm damage and destruction to platform always have spectacular underwater damage photos, and this is indeed the case again with these three hurricanes. In general, the damage has been the same as reported in the prior hurricanes, with buckled braces, cracked joints, cracked legs, etc., primarily due to strength overload. Again, there are few if any confirmed observed foundation failures, even though advanced structural pushover analysis indicates that these failures should have occured [5]. OTC papers for Lili and Ivan [6, 7] show typical examples of these types of damage, and similar damage was observed for Katrina and Rita.

One type of unusual damage that has occurred in several cases has been tentatively called "pancake leg" due to the flattening of the leg in the damaged area point. This damage was first observed in Lili, and then again in Ivan, and was originally thought to be caused by fabrication flaws. But there are now over 12 confirmed instances of this type of failure since hurricane Lili. In addition, there may be similar damage that has not yet found, and this damage may be present on some of the destroyed platforms, or may in fact have been the reason for the platform failure. The damage is believed to develop as a result of the significant stiffness change between the thin walled nominal section of the jacket leg and the thicker joint can section at the horizontal elevations. In the majority of the cases studied, the thinner nominal leg thickness is thinner 1/2 to 5/8 inch wall thickness and the joint cans are 1 to 1 1/2 inches thick. In all cases, the pile was not grouted to the leg.

Figures 5 to 7 show what is believed to be the progression of the damage from initial bulging/buckling to the final pancaking of the leg. Figure 5 shows the initiating local buckle in the thin wall leg section just above the thicker joint can. Figure 6 illustrates the next phase of the damage. This damage is usually found near a longitudinal weld seam, although this is being further verified. The jacket leg begins to acquire more of the loading and usually separates within the heat affected zone between the two differing wall thicknesses. The pancaking of the leg occurs after the leg is severed. This is illustrated in Figure 7. The constant back-and-forth wave motions and resulting platform movement cause the platform to move and "pound" the separated sections into each other resulting in the flattened pancake region. Of the cases studied, the majority of platforms usually had additional jacket damage such as broken joints or buckled braces. The majority of the damage found within the damaged structures consists of separated or torn members, separated X-braces, or a combination of both. This additional damage is believed to allow the platform to incur the movements required to pound the leg flat. Conversely, this additional damage results in platform movement or load redistribution which then triggers the initial leg buckle. This is still being studied. In some cases the pancaking is exceptionally flat as shown in this example, where the pancaking is similar in shape to an external hydrostatic ring stiffener. In other cases, the pancaking is less flat, although it is clearly the same phenomena. Most of the platforms with this type of damage were repaired or are considering repair, although the repair can be costly.

Platforms with exceptionally thin nominal leg thickness (on order of 1/2 inch) and thick joint cans can be prone to this type of damage. This damage can be easily prevented in advance by grouting the leg-pile annulus. Operators should consider this mitigation for their more important platforms that are prone to this type of damage. Additional information can be found in MMS TAR Project No. 578 [8].

Conclusions

The recent Gulf of Mexico hurricanes have provided an opportunity to review platform design standards and to make adjustments as necessary. This paper has provided information and background on the performance of fixed platforms compared to API RP2A. This API code has clearly resulted over time in improvements in platform design as demonstrated by the comparisons with platform hurricane performance in this paper. API is currently reviewing and considering these results, as well as results from other ongoing post hurricane work, to make updates and improvements to RP2A.

Acknowledgements

This paper is a summary of some of the findings in the MMS TAR Project No. 578. A complete copy of this report is available from the MMS website. Energo Engineering and the authors wish to thank the MMS for their support for this project.

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

Figure 1: Ivan, Katrina, Rita Storm Tracks Including MMS NTL Line and Proposed API Metocean Regions



Figure 2: Ivan, Katrina, Rita Platforms Destroyed by Vintage



Figure 3: Ivan, Katrina, Rita Platforms Destroyed by Deck Height [3]



Figure 4: Ivan, Katrina, Rita Platforms Major Damage by Vintage



Figure 5: Pancake leg initial mechanism - Leg bulge caused by local buckling in the thin wall nominal leg region

Figure 6: Severed leg section just above the bulge. Note the longitudinal weld seam just below the sever.



Figure 7: Leg Pancaking. Note the leg has severed and exposed the pile inside the leg

Table 1: Fixed Platform Performance by Region

Ivan, Katrina, Rita Fixed Platforms	Exposure Category	West Central	Central
Number Exposed	A-1	128	42
	A-2	977	208
	A-3	809	168
	L-1	8	1
	L-2	85	16
	L-3	119	16
	Unknown	722	230
	Total	2846	676
Number Destroyed	A-1	4	3
	A-2	45	21
	A-3	29	0
	L-1	0	0
	L-2	4	1
	L-3	4	0
	Unknown	9	3
	Total	95	28
Number Major Damage	A-1	11	9
	A-2	45	14
	A-3	39	3
	L-1	0	0
	L-2	0	0
	L-3	3	0
	Unknown	19	40
	Total	117	65

Notes:
1. A-1, A-2, A-3 RP 2A Section 17 Criteria.
2. L-1, L-2, L-3 RP 2A Section 2 Criteria, installed past 2000.
3. Unknown = API category not known.
4. Number Exposed obtained from MMS & defined by MMS NTL.